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The Steelworkers Trilogy, wherein the United States Supreme Court
endorsed arbitration over litigation as the preferred means of resolving
grievances in private-sector, labor-management relations,' is one of the most
important blocks of decisions in labor law. Correspondingly, the Court granted
private arbitrators significant power and set forth principles governing
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1. The Steelworkers Trilogy refers to the United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); and United Steelworkers v. Warrior & GulfNavigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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presumptive judicial deference to labor-arbitration decisions. 2 The Court made
it very difficult, albeit not impossible, for those challenging adverse arbitration
results to subsequently persuade federal courts to set aside labor-arbitration
decisions rendered in conformance with Trilogy principles. 3
This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Trilogy.4 The 2009 Term of
the United States Supreme Court marked the eve of the anniversary with a
flurry of decisions regarding the scope of judicial deference to arbitration,
includin, but not limited to, the private-sector, labor-management relations
context.
2. See Am. Mgf Co., 363 U.S. at 567-68; Warrior & GulfNavigation Co., 363 U.S. at
581-85; Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 598-99.
3. See Am. Mgf Co., 363 U.S. at 567-68; Warrior& GulfNavigation Co., 363 U.S. at 585;
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599.
4. See supra note 1. Significant law review articles and keynote addresses regarding the
Trilogy include: Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash
Between the Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1988);
David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CAL. L. REV. 663
(1973); Peter Feuille et al., Judicial Review ofArbitration Awards: Some Evidence, 41 LAB. L. J.
477 (1990); William B. Gould IV, JudicialReview of Labor Arbitration Awards-Thirty Years of
the Steelworkers Trilogy: The Aftermath of AT&T and Misco, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 464
(1984); Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, As the Enterprise Wheel Turns: New Evidence on the
Finality ofLabor ArbitrationAwards, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191, 193-94 (2007); Martin H.
Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, PrivatizingJustice: A JurisprudentialPerspective on Labor and
Employment Arbitrationfrom the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGs L.J. 1187 (1993);
Michael Scodro, Deterrence and Implied Limits on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J. 547 (2005);
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at
Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1977); W. Daniel Boone, Keynote
Address at the National Academy of Arbitrators Annual Meeting: Back to the Basics: Arbitration
as "Part of a System of Industrial Self-Government" (May 27, 2010); William B. Gould IV,
Keynote Address at the National Academy of Arbitrators Annual Meeting: Steelworkers Trilogy
After a Half Century (May 27, 2010) [hereinafter Gould, Steelworkers Trilogy]; Andrew M.
Kramer, Keynote Address at the National Academy of Arbitrators Annual Meeting: Fifty Years
After the Steelworkers Trilogy: Some New Questions and Old Answers (May 27, 2010).
5. The Supreme Court issued several decisions in the 2009 Term dealing with alternatedispute resolution, including, but not limited to, labor arbitration in the private sector. In Granite
Rock Co. v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, the Court held that the dispute between an
employer and a union over the formation date of their collective-bargaining agreement (CBA)
was an issue for the district court, not an arbitrator, to resolve. 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2853 (2010). The
Court reasoned that the union's arbitration demand required judicial resolution of two questions:
when the CBA was formed, and whether its arbitration clause covered the matters the union
wished to arbitrate. Id. at 2860-63.
In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, the Court held that, under the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), an arbitration agreement signed as a condition of employment that explicitly delegated to
an arbitrator the decision of whether that agreement was enforceable should be left to the
arbitrator instead of the district court. 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2775-79 (2010). When the employer,
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc., filed a motion to compel arbitration, the employee, Antonio Jackson,
opposed the motion on the basis that the agreement, including the delegation clause, was
unconscionable. Id. at 2775. The employer argued that the arbitrator should have exclusive
authority to determine the enforceability of the agreement, and, therefore, the unconscionability
claim was improperly before the court. Id. The Court noted that there are two types of validity
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In the years following the Trilogy, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit became transparently activist and set aside labor-arbitration
decisions at a disturbingly accelerated pace. This judicial proclivity to nullify
arbitration decisions with which some judges simply disagreed reached its
zenith in 2006 in the Sixth Circuit's decision of Michigan Family Resources,

Inc. v. Service Employees InternationalUnion Local No. 51 7M.7 Judge Jeffrey

challenges: one that challenges specifically the agreement to arbitrate and another that challenges
the entire contract. Id. at 2778. Despite the agreement's severability, the Court held that
Jackson's challenge was to the whole contract and its validity was for the arbitrator to decide. Id
at 2778-79.
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the Court decided that, under the

FAA, an arbitrator may not compel class arbitration for parties whose arbitration clauses were
silent on the issue of class arbitration. 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1770, 1776 (2010). The Court found that
the arbitration panel exceeded its authority when the panel imposed its own policy choice rather
than identifying and applying a rule of decision derived from the FAA, maritime law, or state law.
Id. at 1770.
In Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, the district court referred the parties, including a group of
plaintiffs who were both registered and unregistered copyright-holders and the owners and
publishers of an online database, to mediation because of the growing size and complexity of the
lawsuit. 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010). The plaintiffs moved for the district court to certify a class for
settlement and to approve the settlement agreement, which the district court did. Id at 1242. The
court of appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to approve a settlement with respect
to claims arising from the infringement of unregistered works, but the Supreme Court reversed,
concluding that the district court in fact had the authority to approve the settlement. Id. at 124243. The Supreme Court expressed no opinion on the merits of the settlement. Id. at 1243-44.
The Court in Union Pacific Railroad v. Brotherhood ofLocomotive Engineers & Trainmen

General Committee of Adjustment held that a panel of the National Railroad Adjustment Board
(NRAB) failed "to conform, or confine itself' to the jurisdiction awarded to it by Congress when
the panel refused to adjudicate five cases "for lack ofjurisdiction." 130 S. Ct. 584, 590-95, 59899 (2009). The union was not satisfied with the results of the grievance procedures specified in
its collective-bargaining agreement and sought arbitration before the NRAB. Id. at 593.
Dissatisfied with the NRAB's order, the union filed a petition for review in district court, which
affirmed the NRAB's order. Id. at 594. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed,
finding that the NRAB's proceedings violated due process. Id at 595. The Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment but held that the framework should have been statutory, not constitutional.
Id. at 596, 599. Congress had authorized the NRAB to adjudicate unsettled grievances of railroad
employees following internal-resolution procedures, as well as to prescribe rules for the
presentation and processing of claims. Id. at 590. Ultimately, only Congress defines the NRAB's
jurisdiction. Id. The Court reasoned that if the NRAB lacked authority to define the jurisdiction
of its panels, then certainly the panels themselves lacked that same authority; therefore, the
panel's refusal to adjudicate those cases failed to confine it to matters within the scope of its
jurisdiction. Id at 590-91.
6. See infra Part II.
7.

438 F.3d 653 (6th Cir. 2006) (Mich. Family Res., Inc. 11), rev'd en banc, 475 F.3d 746

(6th Cir. 2007). Professor David Gregory, the principal author of this Article, is a member of the
National Academy of Arbitrators. He and fellow NAA members and law professors, Jay Grenig
and Terry Bethel, authored the NAA amicus brief that successfully urged the Sixth Circuit to
rehear and ultimately reverse its original decision in Michigan Family Resources, Inc. See Brief
of Amicus Curiae National Academy of Arbitrators in Support of Appellant, Mich. Family Res.,
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S. Sutton's powerful concurrence, however, presciently cautioned the unduly
activist majority that it must conform to the Trilogy principles:
If we are to take seriously what the Supreme Court said in this
area and what it has done (to my knowledge it has not authorized the
vacation of a labor arbitration award since 1960), I do not understand
how we can alter the parties' delegation of decision-making authority
in this case merely because one of those parties (the employer) now
thinks that the arbitrator botched the interpretation of the contract.
At most, the employer has shown that the arbitrator misapprehended
the meaning of the contract and misapprehended the rules for
construing contracts. As the district court rightly reasoned and as our
per curiam opinion correctly agrees, the collective bargaining
agreement required parity only as to cost-of-living increases from
the federal government, said nothing about employer-funded
cost-of-living increases and established the minimum increases
that union employees could expect in a given year, increases
tied in no way to the increases given to non-union employees.
Read together, the provision of limited parity requirements and
the provision of express minimum-salary requirements for
union employees strongly imply the exclusion of an overarching
parity requirement between union and non-union employees.
And that implication is strong enough that the arbitrator should
not have pinned his interpretation of the contract on the parties'
practices in implementing it. If a district court in a diversity
case had interpreted the contract in this manner, no one would
doubt that we should correct the error.
But that of course is not the point. An arbitrator selected by
the parties, not a federal district court judge, interpreted this
contract, and that makes all the difference. We have here none
of the tell-tale signs for vacating an award: bias by the
arbitrator, a conflict of interest, a transparent effort to "dispense
his own brand of industrial justice," or a dispute that is not
arbitrable. Instead we have an arbitrator who certainly was
"arguably construing" the contract and who just as certainly
made a "serious error" in construing the contract, a confluence
of circumstances that does not invest us with authority to
"overturn [the] decision." Throughout his ten-page opinion, the
arbitrator references, quotes and analyzes the contract. Even the
flaw in his analysis does not disprove that he was attempting to
construe the contract. "[T]he above language," he says,
"becomes ambiguous because of the Employer's prior decision
Inc. v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Local No. 517M, 475 F.3d 746 (6th Cir. 2007) (No. 04-2564)
[hereinafter Brief of National Academy of Arbitrators].
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to characterize both its individual payment and its payment
from the federal funding source as [a cost-of-living increase]."
Whether the "becomes" phrase was a slip of the pen or a slip in
thought, it was still "the above language"-the contract
language-that he was trying to figure out. Even the district
court characterized these efforts as construction: "[T]he
Arbitrator considered evidence to aid in construing the
[agreement] when, in fact, no construction was necessary." All
that happened here is that the arbitrator committed a legal error,
a serious legal error to be sure, but an error of interpretation
nonetheless, which does not authorize us to vacate the award.
Judge Sutton's wise counsel for judicial restraint became the controlling
rationale when the Sixth Circuit, upon rehearing en banc, returned to
conformance with Trilogy principles.9
This Article examines the three-year period following Michigan Family
Resources, 2007-2010, to assess the Sixth Circuit's treatment of laborarbitration decisions because the circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the original
decision.' 0 Especially when compared with its prior maverick behavior, the
Sixth Circuit has become a veritable model of appellate court judicial
restraint.'' This is certainly not to say that the horizon is utterly quiescent. It
is obvious that several other circuits were, and are, continuing to cavalierly
side-step Trilogy principles in order to vacate labor-arbitration decisions with
which federal judges simply disagree on the substantive merits.1
After providing a brief synthesis of the Trilogy decisions, this Article will
focus specifically on the Michigan Family Resources decision, its reversal en
banc, and the Sixth Circuit's subsequent experience. Although the postMichigan Family Resources situation in the Sixth Circuit is a virtual paragon
of judicial restraint and deference to labor-arbitration decisions, stark
examples of inappropriate judicial activism continue to erupt in several other
circuits.14 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court continues to reiterate the wisdom of
the Steelworkers Trilogy through the 2009-2010 Term.' 5

Mich. Family Res., Inc. II, 438 F.3d at 660 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J., concurring)
citations omitted).
Mich. Family Res., Inc. v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Local No. 517M (Mich. FamilyRes.,
475 F.3d 746, 748 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 59-64, 126-35.
12. See infra Part 111.

8.
(internal
9.
Inc. 111),
10.
11.
13.
14.

15.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III.
See supra note 5.
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1. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE STEELWORKERS TRILOGY

A. United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co.
In United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., a union employee

brought an action for compensation benefits while he was out of work because
of an injury. 16 The parties settled after receiving a physician's diagnosis of
permanent partial-disability. 17 The union later filed a grievance on the ground
that "the seniority provision of the collective bargaining agreement" entitled
the employee to return to work.' 8 The employer refused to arbitrate and the
The district court granted the
union brought an action in district court.
employer's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the employee was
barred from claiming "any seniority or employment rights" because he had
accepted the permanent partial-disability settlement. 20 The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the judgment, though reasoning differently; it held that the grievance
was frivolous and not subject to arbitration.21
The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that "[a]rbitration should have been
ordered" because there was a "dispute between the parties as to 'the meaning,
interpretation and application' of the collective bargaining agreement."22 The
Supreme Court held that courts should not judge the merits of such claims, but
23
instead leave arbitrators to interpret the contract.
The Court warned that,
"[w]hen the judiciary undertakes to determine the merits of a grievance under
the guise of interpreting the grievance procedure of collective bargaining
agreements, it usurps a function ... entrusted to the arbitration tribunal." 24
American Manufacturing Co. also echoed the oft-cited theory from Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama,25 a pre-Trilogy case, reiterating

that an arbitration clause is the quid pro quo for a no-strike clause. 26 The Court
stated that "the agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely
those that a court may deem to be meritorious. There is no exception in the 'no
strike' clause and none therefore should be read into the grievance clause,
since one is the quid pro quo for the other." 27

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
pro quo
26.
27.

363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id at 569.
Id at 567-68
Id. at 569.
353 U.S. 448 (1957) ("[T~he agreement not to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid
for an agreement not to strike.").
Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567.
Id.
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B. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.
In another case of the Trilogy, when an employer began contracting out
maintenance work and consequently laid off union employees, the union filed
a grievance charging that the employer induced a partial lockout of union
employees in violation of the "no lockout" provision of their collectivebargaining agreement.28 The district court granted the employer's motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the agreement did not empower the
arbitrator to review the defendant's business judgment.29 It also held that the
collective-bargaining agreement did not limit the management's function of
contracting out work.30 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that matters
which were strictly a function of management could not be arbitrated because
they were excluded from the grievance procedure.
The Supreme Court's decision reflected the federal policy of "promot[ing]
industrial stabilization through the collective bargaining agreement." 32 The
Court emphasized arbitration's place in the labor setting, noting that
"arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife". The Court disagreed with
the lower courts' view that complaints regarding contracting out work were
automatically excluded from this agreement's grievance provision, citing the
agreement's language that, if "differences" arose, the grievance procedure
would apply. 34 Accordingly, the Court reversed on the ground that a dispute
"as to the meaning and application of the provisions" of the collectivebargaining agreement was subject to arbitration. 35 The Court stated that "[a]n
order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be
said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in
favor of coverage." 36 Thus, because the issue of contracting out work was not
explicitly excluded by the arbitration clause, the parties were obligated to
resolve the claim through arbitration.3 7
Court opinions and commentators often cite to the Supreme Court's
characterization that "the grievance machinery under a collective bargaining
agreement is at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government." 38
28. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 575-76 (1960).
29. Id. at 577.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 578.
33. Id
34. Id. at 583.
35. Id. at 585.
36. Id at 582-83.
37. Id at 584-85.
38. Id at 581; see, e.g., Suzal v. Dir., U.S. Info. Agency, 32 F.3d 574, 584 (D.C. Cit. 1994)
(quoting Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581); Alvin J. Goldman, Selecting the
Correct Standardfor Judicial Review of Airline Grievance Arbitration Decisions, 9 U. PA. J.
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C. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.
In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., the union filed a

grievance after the employer discharged a group of employees. 3 9 When the
employer refused to arbitrate, the union brought suit for "specific enforcement
of the arbitration provisions of the agreement." 40 The collective-bargaining
agreement included an arbitration clause and particular terms governing
employee discharge.4 1 The district court ordered arbitration.42 The arbitrator
found that the employees should have been suspended for, at most, ten days,
and therefore the discharge was unjustified43 Additionally, the arbitrator
"awarded reinstatement with back pay, minus pay for a 10-day suspension and
such sums as these employees received from other employment." 44
When the employer refused to comply with the award, the union petitioned
the district court for enforcement, and the district court ordered the employer to
comply. 45 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit found that the award was
46
First, it held that the award did not
unenforceable, naming three reasons.
specify the exact amount to be deducted from the back pay. 47 Second, the
court held that it could not enforce an award for "back pay subsequent to the
date of termination of the collective-bargaining agreement."48 Finally, it held
that because the collective-bargaining agreement had expired, the award for
reinstatement of the discharged employees was unenforceable. 49
The Supreme Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit that the district court's
judgment should be modified in order that both parties could complete
arbitration to reach a definite determination of the amounts due to the
wrongfully discharged employees.50 However, the Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals in all other respects. 51 The Court reasoned52
that arbitrators are not obligated to provide reasons for an award.
Accordingly, "a mere ambiguity" in the arbitrator's opinion did not justify the
LAB. & EMP. L. 743, 763-64 (2007) (quoting Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581)

(discussing the Steelworkers Trilogy in analyzing the developing law on the use of arbitration to
address issues arising under collective-bargaining agreements).
39. 363 U.S. 593, 595 (1960).
40. Id Although the agreement expired between the time of the discharge and the
arbitration award, "the union . .. continued to represent the workers at the plant." Id at 595.
41.

Id. at 594.

42.
43.

Id.
Id.

44.
45.

Id.
Id.

46. Id. at 595-96.
47.

Id.

48.

Id

49. Id.

50. Id at 599.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 598.
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court's refusal to enforce the award.
The Supreme Court's decision was
consistent with the notion that courts should refuse to review the merits of
arbitration awards under collective-bargaining agreements. 54 Thus, the Court
declared that issues of contract interpretation were best resolved by arbitrators,
and courts should decline to review the merits of an arbitration award.ss
Arguably, the most frequently cited passage from Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp. and, more generally, the Steelworkers Trilogy, is:

[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own
brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from
many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement. 56
This succinctly summarizes the nature and role of an arbitrator in
adjudicating disputes between employers and employees in the context of a
collective-bargaining agreement.
II. FROM MAVERICK ACTIVISM TO A MODEL OF (RELATIVE) JUDICIAL
RESTRAINT: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT AND THE SAGA OF THE MICHIGANFAMILY
RESOURCES DECISIONS

The Supreme Court last decided a labor-arbitration dispute in the 2001 case,
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, reiterating that, as long as an

arbitrator arguably construes a contract, a court should not overturn the
decision.5 7 The Supreme Court's willingness to hear Garvey indicates "a
strong admonition to the judiciary to adhere to the Court's teachings regarding
deference to arbitration awards."5 8 However, despite the Supreme Court's
directive to defer to the parties' agreement to have disputed matters resolved
through arbitration, the Sixth Circuit developed notoriety for vacating
arbitration awards employing a four-part test to analyze the basis of an
arbitration decision. 59 As a result, in the fifty years since the Steelworkers
Trilogy decisions, the Sixth Circuit overturned almost thirty percent of
challenged arbitration awards. This high percentage, especially in light of the
supposed deference to arbitration decisions, raised the eyebrows of parties,
53. Id.
54.
55.

Id. at 596.
Id.

56. Id at 597.
57. 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (per curium).
58.

ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 843 (14th ed. 2006)

(discussing why the Supreme Court agreed to hear Garvey and its summary disposition despite
the fact that "there was no division between the Circuits on a point of law, ordinarily a
prerequisite for Supreme Court consideration").
59.

See infra Part II.A.

60. Mich. Family Res., Inc. II, 438 F.3d 653, 662-72 (6th Cir. 2007) (Sutton, J.,
concurring), rev'den bane, 475 F.3d 746 (6th Cir. 2007).
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scholars, and practitioners across the labor-law spectrum because the Sixth
Circuit's activist approach was contrary to the principles of collective
bargaining and arbitration. 6 1 After 2007, however, the court finally turned the
page on its unorthodox approach and rendered a decision on rehearing that
conformed to the Trilogy standards articulated by the Supreme Court. 62
A. Michigan Family Resources, Inc. v. SEIU Local No. 517M
In Michigan Family Resources, Inc. v. SEIU Local No. 517M, the Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reinforced its reputation for vacating arbitration
decisions, holding that an arbitrator's award failed to "draw its essence" from
the collective-bargaining agreement.63 This marked the twenty-ninth time in
64
twenty years that the Sixth Circuit had vacated an arbitration award. In the
61. See infra Part II.A.
62. See Mich. FamilyRes., Inc. III 475 F.3d 746, 750-57 (6th Cir. 2007); infra Part II.A.
63. See Mich. Family Res., Inc. II, 438 F.3d at 654.
64. Judge Sutton's concurring opinion in Michigan Family Resources, Inc. II included an

appendix cataloguing all of the Sixth Circuit's decisions reviewing arbitration awards. 438 F.3d
at 663-72 (Sutton, J., concurring). According to that appendix, there have been ten published
opinions vacating awards. Id at 665-66. The opinions include the following: Appalachian
Regional Healthcare,Inc. v. United Steelworkers, Local 14398, 245 F.3d 601, 605-607 (6th Cir.
2001); Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227, United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 205 F.3d 922,
929-30 (6th Cir. 2000); InternationalBrotherhoodofElectrical Workers, Local 175 v. Thomas &
Betts Corp., 182 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 1999); Beacon JournalPublishing Co. v. Akron Newspaper
Guild, Local No. 7, 114 F.3d 596, 599-601 (6th Cir. 1997); Ficks Reed Co. v. Local Union 112,
Allied Industrial Workers, 965 F.2d 123, 126 (6th Cir. 1992); InternationalAss'n of Machinists,
Local Lodge No. 2770 v. Lourdes Hospital Inc., 958 F.2d 154, 157 (6th Cir. 1992); AP Parts Co.
v. UAW, 923 F.2d 488, 491-92 (6th Cir. 1991); Ohio Edison Co. v. Ohio Edison Joint Council,
947 F.2d 786, 787 (6th Cir. 1991); InternationalBrotherhoodofElectrical Workers, Local 429 v.
Toshiba Am., Inc., 879 F.2d 208, 209-11 (6th Cir. 1989); Dobbs, Inc. v. Local No. 614,
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, 813 F.2d 85, 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1987). Judge Sutton's

concurrence includes nineteen unpublished opinions vacating awards. Mich. Family Resources,
Inc. II, 438 F.3d at 670-72 (Sutton, J., concurring). These decisions include: Armco Employees
Independent Federation Inc. v. AK Steel Corp., 149 F. App'x 347, 352-53 (6th Cir. 2005);
Sterling Fluid Sys. (USA), Inc. v. Chauffeurs Local Union # 7, 144 F. App'x 457, 463 (6th Cir.
2005); Alken-Ziegler, Inc. v. UAW Local Union 985, 134 F. App'x 866, 868 (6th Cir. 2005);
Paper Workers, Local Union No. 5-998 v. LWD, Inc., 99 F. App'x 683, 685 (6th Cir. 2004);
International Union of Electrical Workers v. Hurd Corp., 7 F. App'x 329, 335 (6th Cir. 2001);
Omnisource Corp. v. UnitedSteelworkers, Local 9130, No. 98-3603, 1999 WL 552600, at *2 (6th
Cir. July 26, 1999); GeneralDrivers, Local 89 v. Willamette Indus., Inc., No. 98-5476, 1999 WL
503465, at *5 (6th Cir. July 6, 1999); United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local No.

1099 v. Kroger Co., No. 98-3423, 1999 WL 232698, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 12, 1999); Marathon Oil
Co. v. Cylinder Gas Employees-Local Union No. 283, No. 97-1780, 1998 WL 702357, at *3 (6th
Cir. Sept. 25, 1998); Hamilton-Stevens Group, Inc. v. UAW, Local 1688, No. 93-3472, 1994 WL
664935, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 23, 1994); Voss Steel Employees Union v. Voss Steel Corp., Nos. 92-

2068, 92-2309, 1994 WL 28610, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 1994); Wrap v. United Paper Workers
InternationalUnion, Local Union 1766, Nos. 92-5031, 92-5032, 1993 WL 84523, *3-4 (6th Cir.
Mar. 24, 1993); Browning-FerrisIndustries of Tenn., Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 984, No.
90-5933, 1991 WL 203110, at *9 (6th Cir. Oct. 10, 1991); Mor-Flo Industries,Inc., Chattanooga
Division v. InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers, No. 90-5605, 1991 WL 29202, at
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case, the employer, Michigan Family Resources (MFR), filed a complaint
against the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), a union
representing some MFR employees.65 MFR sought to have an arbitration
award in the union's favor vacated, and the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the
employer.66 SEIU appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit, seeking an
enforcement of the arbitration award in accordance with the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement negotiated between the parties. 67
The collective-bargaining agreement between MFR and its SEIUrepresented employees included several articles outlining which MFR
employees would be entitled to annual-wage increases.68 The agreement also
contained a provision requiring "the parties to arbitrate any disputes that they
cannot resolve on their own," mandating that the decision of the arbitrator to
be "final and binding upon both parties."69 After MFR notified its union

employees that their annual wage increase would be 2.5%, though the nonunion employees' increase would be 4.0%, SEIU filed a grievance against
MFR. 70 Although the pay increase for union employees satisfied the terms of
the collective-bargaining agreement, the grievance alleged that the collectivebargaining agreement "required parity between union and non-union
employees."n
The arbitrator issued an award in favor of SEIU, determining that, though
the agreement was "not entirely clear" on whether parity was required, the
ambiguity must be resolved based on MFR's prior behavior in granting
specific wage increases. 72 Because MFR had a practice of issuing identical
increases to union and non-union employees in the past, the arbitrator granted

*6-7 (6th Cir. Mar. 7, 1991); Tenn. Valley Authority v. Salary Policy Employee Panel,No. 896397, 1990 WL 166443, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 1990); United Textile Workers, Local 815 v.

BASF Corp.-Fibers,No. 89-5721, 1990 WL 47468, at * 1-3 (6th Cir. Apr. 18, 1990); Magic Chef
Inc. v. InternationalMolders Union, No. 87-5046, 1987 WL 39085, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 1987);
United Paperworkers International Union, Local No. 943. v. Wheaton Industries, No. 85-6090,
1986 WL 18482, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 1986); Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers'
InternationalUnion, Local Union No. 680, No. 85-5777, 1986 WL 17764, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Sept.

15, 1986).
65.

Mich. FamilyRes., Inc. II, 438 F.3d at 654, 656.

66. Id.; see also Mich. Family Res., Inc. v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Local No. 517M, 380 F.
Supp. 2d 886, 887 (W.D. Mich. 2004) (Mich. Family Res., Inc. 1), aff'd, 438 F.3d 653 (6th Cir.
2006), rev'den banc, 475 F.3d 764 (6th Cir. 2007).
67. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 2, Mich. Family Res., Inc. v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union
Local No. 517M, 438 F.3d 653 (6th Cir. 2007) (No. 04-2564).
68.

Mich. Family Res. Inc. II, 438 F.3d at 654-55.

69. Id. at 655 (emphasis added) (quoting Article 5(c) of the collective-bargaining
agreement, which granted the arbitrator full authority to resolve disputes).
70.

Id.

7 1. Id.
72.

Id.
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an award in favor of the union.73 MFR sought to vacate the award in federal
court, and the district court granted its motion for summary judgment.74 The
court held that "the Arbitrator went beyond the express terms of the
[collective-bargaining agreement] by imposing additional requirements upon
the parties and considering past practices, which are specifically disclaimed by
the [collective-bargaining agreement's] waiver provisions.""
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit displayed its tendency to thoroughly review
arbitration awards, despite the standard for review being "one of the narrowest
standards of judicial review in all of American jurisprudence." 76 In doing so,
the court distinguished between arbitration awards that disregard the terms of a
collective-bargaining agreement and those that do not, affording itself the
ability to vacate the award when the former type of award presents itself.77
Delineating the distinction requires a determination of whether an award
"draws its essence" from the collective-bargaining agreement.78 To do this, the
Sixth Circuit employed a four-part test, whereby if any prong was satisfied, the
award was vacated. 9 The Sixth Circuit explained that
[a]n award does not "draw its essence" from the collective
bargaining agreement .

.

. when any of the following is true: "(1) it

conflicts with express terms of the agreement; (2) it imposes
additional requirements not expressly provided for in the agreement;
(3) it is not rationally supported by or derived from the agreement, or
(4) it is based on general considerations of fairness and equity
instead of the exact terms of the agreement."80
The Sixth Circuit interpreted the parties' collective-bargaining agreement
and found that the agreement did not require the wage increases to be at
parity.8 I As a result, the court, applying the four-part test, concluded that
"[w]hen the arbitrator required parity in employer-funded salary increases, he
thus imposed an 'additional requirement not expressly provided for in the
agreement,' one that 'conflict[ed] with express terms of the agreement,' and

73. Id. at 655, 657.
74.

Id. at 656.

75. Mich. Family Res., Inc. 1, 380 F. Supp. 2d 886, 890 (W.D. Mich. 2004), aff'd, 438 F.3d
653 (6th Cir. 2006), rev'den banc, 475 F.3d 746 (6th Cir. 2007).
76. Mich. Family Res., Inc. II, 438 F.3d at 656 (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Tenn. Valley

Trades & Labor Council, 184 F.3d 510, 514-15 (6th Cir. 1999)).
77. Id. ("When an award 'draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement,' we
will uphold it; when it does not, we will vacate the award.") (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)).
7 8.

Id.

79. Id
80. Id. (quoting Sterling China Co. v. Glass Workers Local No. 24, 357 F.3d 546, 556 (6th
Cir. 2004)) (citing Cement Divs., Nat'l Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers, Local 135, 793 F.2d
759, 766 (6th Cir. 1986)).
81. Idat657.
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one that accordingly did not draw its essence from the agreement." 82
Furthermore, in affirming the district court, the Sixth Circuit held that the
arbitration award was properly vacated "because the Arbitrator considered
evidence [of MFR's past practices and customs] to aid in construing the
[collective bargaining agreement] when, in fact, no construction was
necessary." 83
In reaching its ultimate decision, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the union's
argument, supported by Supreme Court precedent, that "an arbitration award
should not be vacated merely because the arbitrator commits a legal error in
construing the collective bargaining agreement." 84
However, as the
concurrence illustrated,85 despite the Supreme Court precedent in terms of
reviewing arbitration awards, the Sixth Circuit felt bound by its four-part test. 86
The Sixth Circuit's tenacious activism trumped the Trilogy.
Judge Sutton concurred, but identified a variety of inherent problems with
the Sixth Circuit's approach to arbitral decisions, particularly regarding the
four-part test. Identifying the Steelworkers Trilogy as the Supreme Court's
desire "to end the federal courts' hostility to labor-arbitration awards," 88 Judge
Sutton acknowledged that "'[t]he refusal of courts to review the merits of an
arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective
bargaining agreements."' 8 9 Furthermore, Judge Sutton drew inspiration from
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, a Supreme Court decision

directing that "[s]o long as 'an arbitrator is even arguably construing or
applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, the fact that
a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overtum his
decision."' 90 The Trilogy continues to stand for the principle that a court
should refrain from interpreting contract language where the contract provides
that the matter at issue be submitted to arbitration.91 The significance of strong
82. Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Sterling China Co., 357 F.3d at 556).
83. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Mich. Family Res., Inc. I, 380 F. Supp. 2d
886, 890 (W.D. Mich. 2004), aff'd, 438 F.3d 653 (6th Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 475 F.3d 746
(6th Cir. 2007)).
84. Id.
85. See id at 658-63 (Sutton, J., concurring) (explaining Supreme Court precedent and
noting the ways in which the Sixth Circuit has departed from that precedent, calling for the court
to "reconsider the Supreme Court's directives").
86. Id. at 657 (majority opinion).
87. Id. at 661-63 (Sutton, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 658.
89. Id. (alternation in original) (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car. Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)).
90. Id. (quoting Major League Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (per
curium)).

Judge Sutton, relying on United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,

reiterated that "an arbitrator's award premised on his construction of the contract permissibly
'draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement' and should be upheld." Id. (quoting
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597).

91.

Id at 658 (citing United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960)).
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deference to the arbitrator's decision, as Judge Sutton pointed out, is that the
parties bargained for the arbitrator's, not the court's, construction of the
Thus, "the courts have no business overruling [the arbitrator
agreement.
because their interpretation of the contract is different from his."9
Accordingly, Judge Sutton stated that the court's standard for review of
arbitration awards was the narrowest he could identify; nonetheless, he
concurred in vacating the arbitration award in Michigan Family Resources,
Inc.94

Even though Judge Sutton felt bound by the Sixth Circuit's use of the fourpart test to review arbitration awards and concurred in the opinion as a result,
he was uneasy about the test's application. 95 He stated, "This formulation, I
respectfully believe, has made it easier to vacate an arbitration award on the
merits than the Supreme Court meant it to be." 96 Specifically, Judge Sutton
maintained that the first two prongs of the four-part test were directly
contradictory to Supreme Court precedent. 97 Both prongs, Judge Sutton

92.

Id. (citing Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599).

93. Id. (quoting Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599). Judge Sutton went on to
quote another of the Trilogy cases, stating that
[r]egardless of what our view might be of the correctness of [the arbitrator's]
contractual interpretation, the Company and the Union bargained for that interpretation,
and that interpretation must be upheld even if time and further review show that the
parties in the end have bargained for nothing more than error.
Id at 658-59 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting WR Grace & Co. v. Local Union
759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 765 (1983)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Supreme Court, said Judge Sutton, demands that "the delegation of
decision-making authority chosen by the contracting parties" be respected. Id at 659.
94. Id. at 659, 663. Judge Sutton declared:
We have here none of the tell-tale signs for vacating an award: bias by an arbitrator,
a conflict of interest, a transparent effort to "dispense his own brand of justice," or a
dispute that is not arbitrable. Instead we have an arbitrator who certainly was
"arguably construing" the contract and who just as certainly made a "serious error" in
construing the contract, a confluence of circumstances that does not invest us with
authority to "overturn [the] decision."
Id. at 660 (quoting Garvey, 532 U.S. at 509).
95. Id at 663 ("Because I am bound by our four-part test and our practice in applying it, I
feel obliged to concur in the decision vacating this arbitration award-even though this case
strikes me as presenting precisely the kind of 'serious error' that the Supreme Court has expected
we would permit arbitrators to make.").
96. Id. at 661. Judge Sutton recognized that the Supreme Court urged that the "'proper
approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements' is to 'refus[e] . . . to review the
merits of an arbitration award."' Id (quoting Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 596).
Therefore, Judge Sutton found that Supreme Court precedent requires that, absent "fraud" or the
"arbitrator's dishonesty," arbitration awards should be upheld "so long as the arbitrator is
'arguably construing' the contract, even when that construction results in a 'serious error."' Id.
(quoting Garvey, 532 U.S. at 509).
97. Id. ("Nor is it clear to me how the first two parts of our test--(1) whether the award
conflicts with 'express terms' of the agreement or (2) whether the award 'imposes additional
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offered, "seem to be in tension with Garvey's directive that a 'serious error' in
interpreting a contract does not provide an independent ground for vacating an
arbitration award so long as the arbitrator was 'arguably construing' the
contract."98 After adopting the four-part test, the Sixth Circuit vacated an
alarming number of arbitration awards, 99 nearly twenty-seven percent of all
labor-arbitration cases it heard, illustrating
"that the four-part test has been
00
anything but deferential in application."'
The Sixth Circuit's decision to vacate the arbitration award had a heavy
impact on the labor-management community, proving once again that a
determined activist court can almost always semantically contrive a rationale
to overrule an arbitrator's award despite the terms of the collective-bargaining
agreement specifying that arbitration would be the sole and final authority for
dispute resolution between the parties.' 0 ' The Michigan Family Resources,
Inc. decision was met with much opposition urging the court to reexamine its
methodology.1 02 For example, the National Academy of Arbitrators ("the
Academy")1 03 filed an amicus brief with the court, stressing the necessity of

requirements that are not expressly provided in the agreement'
an be reconciled with Supreme
Court precedent.").
98. Id (quoting Garvey, 532 U.S. at 509).
99. The Sixth Circuit "vacated 29% (10 out of 34) of labor-arbitration awards that [it had]
reviewed on merits-based grounds" and vacated 25% (19 out of 75) awards of unpublished
opinions on similar grounds. Id at 662. Notably, Judge Sutton points out, "all of this has
happened at the same time the Supreme Court has said that 'courts will set aside the arbitrator's
interpretation of what their agreement means only in rare instances."' Id. (quoting E. Associated
Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000)).
100.

Id. at 663.

101. See Brief of National Academy of Arbitrators, supra note 7, at 11-13, 15-16 ("Had the
parties wanted the Court's judgment about the meaning of their contract, they could have easily
agreed to forego arbitration and pursue remedies in court. Here, they opted for arbitration and the
benefits it affords, typically identified as faster and less costly than litigation and, most important,
final.").
102. See, e.g., Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations, as Amicus Curiae, in support of Defendant-Appellant at 2, 12, Mich. Family Res.,
Inc. v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Local No. 517M, 475 F.3d 746 (6th Cir. 2007) (No. 04-2564)
(urging the court to abandon its four-part test and reverse the judgment of the district court); Brief
of National Academy of Arbitrators, supra note 7, at 2 (advocating that the court abandon its
four-part test because it "exceeds the scope of judicial review permitted by Supreme Court
decisions and undermines the parties' agreement that arbitration awards are to be final and
binding").
103. Founded in 1947, the National Academy of Arbitrators is a neutral organization whose
principal purpose is to
establish and foster the highest standards of integrity, competence, honor, and
character among those engaged in the arbitration of labor-management disputes on a
professional basis; to secure the acceptance of and adherence to the Code of
Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes . . . ; to

promote the study and understanding of the arbitration of labor-management and
employment disputes ....
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upholding arbitration awards and encouraging the Sixth Circuit to "abandon its
four-part test for determining whether an arbitrator's award draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement." 1 04 Using the four-part test required
the court to assign meaning to the contract language, but the Academy argued
that such practice "far exceed[ed] the scope of judicial review permitted by
Supreme Court decisions and undermine[d] the parties' agreement that
arbitration awards are to be final and binding," ultimately subverting the
parties' bargain and the arbitration process. t os In applying the test, the court
must assess the merits of the case, an action inappropriate for a court reviewing
arbitration awards. o0 The major problem with applying the four-part test is
that each prong "focuses on whether the arbitrator's decision was correct, not
whether his decision was based-or even arguably based--on . . . the

contract."' 0 7 Finally, in its brief arguing for the abandonment of the four-part
test, the Academy explained that it would not review the case at issue in detail
because the arguments advanced in Judge Sutton's concurring opinion could
not be improved. 0 8
Despite the court's vacation of the arbitration award, Judge Sutton correctly
identified that "[a]ll that happened [in the case was] that the arbitrator
committed a legal error, a serious legal error to be sure, but an error of
interpretation nonetheless, which does not authorize us to vacate the award."l09
Brief of National Academy of Arbitrators, supra note 7, at 1 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
104. Id at 2. The Academy thought it was appropriate to file a brief with the court because
the court's decision in Michigan Family Resources, Inc. had "the potential for disturbing the
salutary regime established by the Supreme Court's prior decisions," and the involvement of the
law in the arbitration process "should serve to effectuate the purposes for which employers and
unions have developed voluntary arbitration." Id. at 1-2.
105. Id at 2-4, 6-7. The test, the Academy argued, "is inconsistent with the standards
articulated by the Supreme Court and misconstrues [the Sixth Circuit's] role in the dispute
settlement process of arbitration." Id. at 3.
106. Id. at 2.
107. Id. at 6.
Parties who are dissatisfied with the result of a case can appeal to a court for a
different interpretation, arguing that the "plain meaning" of the contract language
compels a rejection of the arbitrator's reading of the agreement. Using the plain
meaning rule inevitably results in cases like the one at issue here, where the Court
reversed the arbitrator's award because there was only "one proper interpretation."
Id. at 10. But, through consenting to an arbitration agreement, "the parties made it clear ... that
the Court was to play no such role in resolving their disputes. Here, the parties hired the
arbitrator to do that and, whether his decision was correct or not, they agreed to be bound by his
work. Id. at 13.
108. Id. at 3.
109. Mich. Family Res., Inc. II., 438 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J., concurring),
rev'd en banc, 475 F.3d 746 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Brief of National Academy of Arbitrators,
supra note 7, at 12 ("[E]ven if the arbitrator should not have considered past practice, it is
impossible to conclude that the arbitrator's interpretation did not draw its essence from the
contract. The arbitrator assigned meaning to contract language, even if he got it wrong. The
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This is precisely the unstable ground on which the initial decision stood.110
The Sixth Circuit returned to fealty to Trilogy principles, which Judge Sutton
illustrated so particularly in his concurrence with the original decision,"' and
abandoned its infamous four-part test."12
Profound deference to the arbitrator's decision is "consistent with the
parties' bargain and . . . flaws at any rate can be corrected by the remedy of

choosing better arbitrators.""i 3 Arbitration provides an expeditious forum for
labor-management disputes that might otherwise escalate to strikes, lockouts,
or other interferences with production.l14 However, for arbitration to be a
successful mechanism, "the process [must] end[] when the arbitrator rules."" 5
Accordingly, where court decisions "encourage the disappointed party to seek
review, thus continuing the dispute the arbitration agreement was intended to
end," the underlying goals of the process cannot be met.116
On rehearing, Judge Sutton appropriately delivered the opinion of the court
in conformity with the letter and the spirit of the Trilogy.1 7 The Sixth Circuit
reversed its original decision and entered an order enforcing the arbitrator's
award." 8 The court abandoned its use of the four-part test, determined that the
arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority in resolving the dispute, and
found no fraud or dishonesty present." 9 In doing so, the court concluded that
the arbitrator was arguably construing the contract in determining that parity
must be present in wage increases.12 Because there was nothing to indicate
that the arbitrator made more than an error, though possibly a "serious" one,
when interpreting the agreement, the court exercised its proper authority and
deferred to the parties' assent to resolve disputes through arbitration.121
Deviating from its initial approach in the case, the Sixth Circuit
acknowledged, and this time followed, the Supreme Court's "insistence that
the federal courts must tolerate 'serious' arbitral errors."l 22 The court
Court vacated the award because the arbitrator used a rule of interpretation that the Court would
not have used.").
110. See Mich. Family Res., Inc. H1, 438 F.3d at 660 (Sutton, J., concurring).
Ill. Id.at658,663.
112.

Mich. Family Res., Inc. III, 475 F.3d 746, 753 (6th Cir. 2007).

113.
114.

Mich. Family Res., Inc. II, 438 F.3d at 662 (Sutton, J., concurring).
Brief of National Academy of Arbitrators, supra note 7, at 11-12.

115.

Id at 17.

116. Id "Rules that jeopardize the finality of the [arbitration] process undermine the utility
of arbitration as an instrument of industrial peace." Id
117. Mich. Family Res., Inc. III, 475 F.3d at 748.
118. Id.
119. Id. (overruling Cement Divs. Nat'l Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers, 793 F.2d 759
(6th Cir. 1986)).
120. Id.
121. Id
122. Id. at 753 (suggesting that "judicial consideration of the merits of a dispute is a rare
exception, not the rule").
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identified that, "in most cases, it will suffice to enforce the award that the
arbitrator appeared to be engaged in interpretation, and if there is doubt [the
court] will presume that the arbitrator was doing just that."1 23
The opinion on rehearing offered the flip side of the coin, illustrating the
basic Trilogy principles of arbitration and suggesting a changed approach by
the Sixth Circuit in reviewing awards.124 Although the court maintained that
the "'arguably construing' inquiry . . . will permit only the most egregious

awards to be vacated," it acknowledged that this approach is necessary and
significant because it "respects the parties' decision to hire their own judge to
resolve their disputes, a view that respects the finality clause in most
arbitration agreements . . . ,125
The three judges who concurred in part and dissented in part agreed with the
majority that the four-part test must be abandoned and acknowledged that the
test had "allowed [the Sixth Circuit] too much latitude to review the merits of
arbitrator interpretations of collective bargaining agreements, in contravention
of the dictates of the Supreme Court's Steelworkers Trilogy."l26 However, the
three judges felt that the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, a result of
only two post-Trilogy decisions by the Court,127 called for the adoption of
another test, one that replaced the four-part test with "an inquiry that looks
only for 'procedural aberrations' committed by the arbitrator, not for legal
error."l 28 This, the concurrence/dissent argued, would mirror an application of
what the Supreme Court provided for in Misco. 129
123.

Id

124.

Id. at 751-54.

125. Id at 753-54 (indicating that this view can also be remedied by choosing better
arbitrators).
126. Id. at 757.
127. Id.; see Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509-10 (2001)
("Judicial Review of a labor-arbitration decision pursuant to such an agreement is very limited.
Courts are not authorized to review the arbitrator's decision on the merits despite allegations that
the decision rests on factual errors or misinterprets the parties' agreement. . . . [I]f an arbitrator is
even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, the
fact that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his
decision." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United Paperworkers Int'l
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-38 (1987) (reminding litigants that the courts have a
limited role in labor-arbitration decisions and noting that "as long as the arbitrator is even
arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within his scope of authority," even
"serious error" does not allow the court to overturn the decision).
128.

Mich. Family Res., Inc. 111, 475 F.3d at 757.

Id. at 760; see Misco, 484 U.S. at 40 n.10. In Misco, the Court provided that
[i]n the very rare instances when an arbitrator's procedural aberrations rise to the
level of affirmative misconduct, as a rule the court must not foreclose further
proceedings by settling the merits according to its own judgment of the appropriate
result, since this step would improperly substitute a judicial determination for the
arbitrator's decision that the parties bargained for in the collective-bargaining
agreement. Instead, the court should simply vacate the award, thus leaving open the
possibility of further proceedings if they are permitted under the terms of the

129.
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B. The Trend After Michigan Family Resources, Inc. III
Sixth Circuit reviews of labor-arbitration awards have since remained
consistent with Michigan Family Resources, Inc. III.

Since the rehearing

decision on January 26, 2007, the Sixth Circuit has reviewed approximately
thirteen labor-management arbitration award disputes based on collectivebargaining agreements.1 30 Of these, approximately four have been published
in the Federal Reporter, and, of the four, three decisions have upheld the
arbitrator's award; 3 only one has vacated the award.132 Of the remaining nine
unpublished opinions, the court upheld eight awardsl33 and vacated one.134

agreement. The court also has the authority to remand for further proceedings when
this step seems appropriate.
Id.

130. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
131. See Truck Drivers Local No. 164 v. Allied Waste Sys., Inc., 512 F.3d 211, 213 (6th Cir.
2008) (holding that the arbitrator did not operate outside the scope of his authority by resolving
the dispute, and that the arbitrator arguably construed and applied the collective-bargaining
agreement); Netiets Aviation, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Airline Div., 486 F.3d 935, 939-40
(6th Cir. 2007) (holding that an arbitration award finding a pilot's conduct was not just cause for
termination under the collective-bargaining agreement did not violate public policy even if a
public-policy review was permitted under the Railway Labor Act); Black v. Surface Transp. Bd.,
476 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the Surface Transportation Board did not act arbitrarily
and capriciously in upholding an arbitration award determining that employees lost their benefits
when they refused to fill vacancies in the rail system).
132. See Totes Isotoner Corp. v. Int'l Chem. Workers Union Council/UFCW Local 664, 532
F.3d 405, 418 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that a supplemental labor-arbitration award exceeded the
scope of an arbitrator's authority).
133. See Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. v. Utility Workers, Local 349, 329 F. App'x 1, 6 (6th
Cir. 2009) (holding that the enforcement of an arbitration award does not violate public policy);
Satyam Computer Servs., Ltd. v. Venture Global Eng'g, L.L.C., 323 F. App'x 421, 429 (6th Cir.
2009) (holding that it is within the district court's discretion to deny a motion to vacate a
judgment that enforced an arbitration award); Kroger Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers
Union Local 876, 284 F. App'x 233, 241-42 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that the arbitrator did not
act outside his authority and arguably interpreted and construed the collective-bargaining
agreement); Mich. Sugar Co. v. Bakery Workers Int'l Union, Locals 259-G, 260-G, 261-G, 262G, 278 F. App'x 623, 628-29 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that the arbitrator appeared to be engaged
in interpretation and, thus, the arbitration award would be upheld); Roll Coater, Inc. v. Chauffeurs
Local Union No. 215, 263 F. App'x 445, 449 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that the arbitrator was
arguably construing the collective-bargaining agreement); Earle v. NetJets Aviation Inc., 262 F.
App'x 698, 702 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that the arbitrator, in denying grievances, was "arguably
construing" a collective-bargaining agreement and incorporating agreements and regulations);
Bauer v. Carty & Co., Inc., 246 F. App'x 375, 379-80 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the employee
failed to show clear and convincing evidence of fraud, as required to vacate the arbitration
award); Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., Local 174 v.
Mich. Mech. Servs., Inc., 247 F. App'x 649, 654 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the arbitrator at
least arguably construed the relevant contractual provisions).
134. R.H. Cochran & Assocs., Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 33,
335 F. App'x 516, 520-21 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming the district court's vacation of an arbitration
award because the district court's finding that the employer raised a timeliness objection before
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Therefore, of the thirteen decisions since January 2007 in which the Sixth
Circuit reviewed arbitration awards, eleven were upheld and only two were
vacated. It appears that the Sixth Circuit has repudiated its activist approach
toward arbitration review and finally embraced the ideals of deference set forth
in the Trilogy.135
II. THE TRILOGY AT FIFTY

In the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court declared that section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947136 required the courts to embrace
a policy favoring arbitration, holding that doubts should be resolved in favor of
arbitration.' 37 By the close of the twentieth century, however, the Court had
reversed the presumption of arbitrability.138 In Wright v. Universal Maritime
Service Corp., the Court held that a longshoreman was not required by his
collective-bargaining agreement to use the arbitration procedure for claims
alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.1 39 In that case, the
Court applied a "clear and unmistakable" standard, requiring that waivers of
the right to sue for statutory claims be "particularly clear."' 40
In the third and final case of the Steelworkers Trilogy, Enterprise Wheel &

Car Corp., the Supreme Court declared that arbitrators do "not sit to dispense
[their] own brand of industrial justice," and awards must "draw[] [their]
essence from the collective bargaining agreement."1 4 1 Some lower courts
perceived this as creating a loophole and used the "essence" language to serve
their own purposes of vacating awards with which they disagreed.142 It
appeared as though Supreme Court intervention would be instructive when the
Court issued its decision in United Paperworkers International Union v.

Misco, Inc.143

The opinion emphasized that courts should not doubt

the arbitration panel was not clear error, and the union was barred by the invited error doctrine
from appealing the district court's allegedly improper use ofaffidavits).
135. See United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960) (stating that the
function of the court is very limited with regard to arbitration decisions); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) (recognizing that federal policy is in
favor of promoting industrial stabilization through the collective-bargaining agreement); United
Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) ("The refusal of the courts
to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach.").
136. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006).
137.
138.

See Warrior& GulfNavigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83.
See David E. Feller, Putting Gilmer Where It Belongs: The FAA's Labor Exemption, 18

HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 253, 258 (2000) [hereinafter Feller, The FAA 's Labor Exemption].
139. 525 U.S. 70, 79 (1998).
140. Id. at 79-80.
141. See United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
142.

See Feller, The FAA's Labor Exemption, supra note 138, at 278.

143.

484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
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arbitrators' decisions.144 Nonetheless, Misco was insufficient to realign the
145
lower courts, which continued to question arbitrators' awards and reasoning.
For example, the Eighth Circuit contravened the Steelworkers Trilogy in an
opinion that ustified vacating an award when an arbitrator failed to explain his
reasoning.' 4
As the lower courts' defiance continued, the Supreme Court sent "strong
signals" to the lower courts to defer to the judgment of arbitrators. 47 In Major
League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, the Court reemphasized that

"[c]ourts are not authorized to review the arbitrator's decision on the merits
despite allegations that the decision rests on factual errors or misinterprets the
parties' agreement." 48
Lower courts will sometimes set aside an award if the courts believe the
arbitrator inaccurately defined a term of the collective-bargaining agreement.
For instance, the Fifth Circuit. vacated an arbitrator's award because it
disagreed with the arbitrator's interpretation of a clause in a collectivebargaining agreement, which allowed the employer to discharge employees
without notice for "immoral conduct." 49 In this case, the arbitrator had
reinstated an employee who was discharged immediately following her
employer's discovery that she had lied about why she needed to leave work for
forty-five minutes. o The Fifth Circuit held that, by definition, lying was
immoral conduct, and therefore the arbitrator's award should be reversed
because it was not derived from the contract.' 5'
In another Fifth Circuit case, the court acknowledged the limited nature of
review under section 301, but then invoked the use of a "plain meaning"
rule,' 52 which postulated that a court may set aside an award because the

144.

See id; see also Feller, The FAA's Labor Exemption, supra note 138, at 279 ("[T]he

Court made it clear that under section 301 courts should not second guess the arbitrator.").
145.

See Feller, The FAA's Labor Exemption, supra note 138, at 279.

146. See George A. Hormel & Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 9, 879
F.2d 347, 351 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[W]here an arbitrator . . . offers no clear basis for how he
construed the contract to reach his decision without such consideration, there arises a strong
possibility that the award was not based on the contract.").
147. Martin H. Malin, Due Process in Employment Arbitration: The State of the Law and the
Need for Self-Regulation, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 363, 370-71 (2007) (discussing how the
federal policy favoring arbitration influenced the Supreme Court in encouraging arbitrators to be
the judges of whether arbitral forums were adequate to vindicate statutory rights); see also Boone,
supra note 4, at 27-28 (discussing the Court's reaffirmation and reiteration of the policy that
courts should heavily defer to an arbitrator's decision).
148. 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001).
149. See Bruce Hardwood Floors v. UBC, S. Council of Indus. Workers, Local Union No.
2713, 103 F.3d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 1997).
150. Id. at 450-51.
151.

1dat452&n.4.

152. Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. Dist. 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 889 F.2d 599,
602, 604 (5th Cir. 1990). The Fifth Circuit is not alone in its reasoning; see Georgia-Pacific
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arbitrator took action "contrary to express contractual provisions.,,153 In Delta
Queen Steamboat Co. v. District 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, an

arbitrator reinstated a riverboat captain, Philip Ritchie, who had been
terminated for almost causing a collision between his vessel and a barge.154
The collective-bargaining agreement prohibited discharge without "proper
cause." 55 Despite Captain Ritchie's gross carelessness, the arbitrator found no
proper cause for discharging Ritchie because prior company mishaps involving
other employees had resulted in actual collisions and damages, but led to no
disciplinary action for those employees.' 56 The Fifth Circuit held that
Ritchie's gross carelessness was sufficient cause for disciplinary action.' 57 In
reality, the Fifth Circuit used its view that gross carelessness was sufficient
cause for termination as justification to vacate the reinstatement portion of the
arbitral award. 58
Yet another ground exists for courts to challenge labor-arbitration-awardspublic policy.1 9 The Eighth Circuit set aside an arbitrator's award that
reinstated an employee who had violated federally mandated safety regulations
on the grounds that the employee could not appreciate the potential danger of
the situation because his job training had not adequately addressed the scenario
that the employee encountered. 160 The Eighth Circuit vacated this award in
part because it found that, similar to other cases where arbitration awards had
been abandoned, the employee deliberately acted in a way that jeopardized
public safety.'61
Similarly, in employer-promulgated arbitration systems, courts may modify
or decline to enforce arbitration agreements that they find unconscionable.
Courts derive this power from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 16 which
states that written arbitration agreements are "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the

Corp. v. Local 27, United Paperworkers International Union, 864 F.2d 940, 944-46 (1st Cir.
1988), for a First Circuit case involving similar facts and outcome.
153. David E. Feller, Taft and Hartley Vindicated: The Curious History of Review of Labor
Arbitration Awards, 19 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 296, 303 (1998) [hereinafter Feller, Taft
and Hartley Vindicated].
154. Delta Queen Steamboat Co., 889 F.2d at 601.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id at 604.
158. See id
159. See Feller, The FAA's Labor Exemption, supra note 138, at 281.
160. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204 of the Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
834 F.2d 1424, 1425-26 (8th Cir. 1987).
161. Id. at 1428.
162. See Malin, supra note 147, at 368.
163. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006).
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revocation of any contract."l 64 Absent partiality, fraud, corruption, or
misconduct, a court cannot set aside an arbitration award. 165
It would seem that the FAA's stringent standard for vacating arbitration
awards would prevent the lower courts from engaging in mischief through
judicial review. But, despite the Supreme Court's warning that public-policy
exceptions should be used sparingly, the lower courts tend to apply these
exceptions more broadly.1 For instance, a panel of the Ninth Circuit applied
public-policy reasoning to a straight-forward discharge case, only to be
corrected by an en banc decision.167
Today, the circuit courts are split on whether Congress has precluded
judicial review of certain National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB)
proceedings.168 The NRAB is authorized by Congress to adjudicate grievances
of railroad employees and their carriers if the parties are unable to resolve their
disputes through the grievance procedures specified in their collectivebargaining agreements. 169 Congressional amendments in 1966 stated grounds
on which parties could seek judicial review of NRAB orders.1 70 But the courts
of appeals are in disagreement about whether that provision precludes judicial
review of NRAB proceedings for due process violations.171
This confusion seems to arise from a previous Supreme Court decision.1 72
Consequently, some circuits have held that review was precluded for dueprocess claims beyond those specifically articulated in the Railway Labor
Act,173 though other circuits have held that review was available.174 The issue
resurfaced in 2009, but the Supreme Court did not have the occasion to answer
164.
165.

Id § 2.
Id. § 10; see Feller, Taft and Hartley Vindicated,supra note 153, at 301-02 (explaining

that "under Section 10 of [the FAA] an award can be set aside only, in reality, if one can show
corruption, bias, or fraud").
166. See Charles J. Coleman & Gerald C. Coleman, Toward a New Paradigm of Labor
Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 50-51 (1995).

167. See Coleman & Coleman, supra note 166, at 51 (citing Stead Motors v. Auto.
Machinists, Lodge No. 1173, 843 F.2d 357, 358 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd en banc, 886 F.2d 1200,
1202 (9th Cir. 1989)).
168. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 130 S. Ct. 584, 592-93 (2009).
169. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (2006).
170. Act of June 20, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-456, § 2(e), 80 Stat. 208, 210 (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (q)).
171.

Union Pac. R.R. Co., 130 S. Ct. at 592-93.

172.

Id. at 593 n.4 (explaining that the disagreement stemmed from the Supreme Court's

opinion in Union PacificRailroadCo. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89 (1978)).

173. See, e.g., Kinross v. Utah Ry. Co., 362 F.3d 658, 662 (10th Cir. 2004); Jones v.
Seaboard Sys. R.R., 783 F.2d 639, 642 n.2 (6th Cir. 1986); Henry v. Delta Air Lines, 759 F.2d
870, 873 (1lth Cir. 1985) (per curiam); United Steelworkers, Local 1913 v. Union R.R. Co., 648
F.2d 905, 911-12 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (2006)).
174. See Shafli v. PLC British Airways, 22 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 1994); Edelman v. W.
Airlines, Inc., 892 F.2d 839, 847 (9th Cir. 1989).
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the question of whether a reviewing court may set aside an NRAB adjudication
for incompatibility with due process; the case was decided on statutory
grounds, leaving no "genuinely in controversy" issue.1 75
In essence, a trend has emerged since the Steelworkers Trilogy, whereby
lower courts continue to challenge labor-arbitration awards.
IV. THE TREND FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS: LABOR AND
BEYOND

As some commentators have noticed, "circuit courts of appeal often appear
reluctant to accept the guidelines offered by the Supreme Court. Their
decisions are often inconsistent with one another, as is illustrated by the
conflicting approaches that different appellate courts have taken . . . ." The
tendency of some courts to challenge arbitration awards is not limited to the
labor-management context.
For example, the Supreme Court decided a number of cases involving the
waiver of an employee's right to seek relief in court. In 1991, the Supreme
Court determined,

in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson-Lane Corp., that a

nonunionized worker in the financial-services industry was bound by the terms
of the mandatory arbitration clause to which he agreed when he was hired.177
The decision barred the plaintiff in Gilmer from litigating his claim under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.178
The Court revisited the waiver issue in 14 Penn Plaza L.L.C. v. Pyett.179
The Supreme Court held that "a collective bargaining agreement that clearly
and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is
enforceable as a matter of federal law."so
The circuit courts are not alone in the tendency to challenge and diverge
from Supreme Court precedent. Although the circuit courts sometimes seem to
rely on their own reasoning, often justifying their actions through
distinguishing cases based on the facts,' some critics would argue that the
Court itself diverges unnecessarily from logic. For example, critics target
Pyett, asserting that the majority operated under "an assumption that was both
a non sequitur and erroneous," and the decision was "rooted in so many errors
and misconceptions that it is difficult to know where to begin."1 82 Others are
unsure of the impact the Pyett decision will have on employers, employees,

175.

See Union Pac. R.R. Co., 130 S. Ct. at 595-96.

176. See Coleman & Coleman, supra note 166, at 50.
177. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23, 35 (1991).
178. See id.

179. 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1469, 1474 (2009).
180. Id. at 1474.
181.

182.

See, e.g., supra Part II.A.
Gould, Steelworkers Trilogy, supra note 4, at 34, 36.
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unions, and arbitrators.' 83 One thing is certain: Pyett will pose a number of
challenges in the grievance and arbitration arenas.' 84
Justice William 0. Douglas's Steelworkers Trilogy opinion in Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co. was entirely focused on section 301,185 which is most
likely a consequence of the fact that Professor Feller, who argued the Trilogy,
In
limited his arguments to section 301 and did not involve the FAA.
contrast, the Pyett Court relied on the FAA, "rais[ing] the question as to what,
if any, meaningful difference there is in the route one takes to challenge or
enforce an award."l 87
Whereas labor arbitration operates to avoid industrial strife and litigation,
The laws surrounding
commercial arbitration functions differently.
commercial arbitration are inspired by contract law and principles of
practicality.189 Notwithstanding the differences between the two categories of
arbitration, the lower courts-and, at times, the Supreme Court-cite
interchangeably to labor and commercial cases arising under the FAA in their
discussions of whether to order arbitration.190 It appears that under the FAA,
the hostility toward commercial arbitration that existed at the time of the
Trilogy has faded almost entirely.191
On the other hand, the enforceability of arbitration awards has not
undergone a drastic change in status over time. The traditional, common-law
view pertaining to the enforceability of arbitration awards was that awards
should be enforced, regardless of the court's inclinations.192 The FAA

183.

Kramer, supra note 4, at 1-3 (noting his uncertainty regarding the impact of Pyett and

discussing the implications the decision may have).
184. See David L. Gregory & Edward McNamara, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory
Claims, and the Future of Fair Employment: 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.

POL'Y 429, 454 (2010) ("Pyett poses many challenges and opportunities for the conventional
grievance and arbitration procedure."); see also Gould, Steelworkers Trilogy, supra note 4, at 23

("[S]urely the Court ... as well as Congress will be called upon to revisit the errors with which
the opinion is strewn."); Kramer, supra note 4, at I ("The decision in Pyett will require unions to
consider how they can accommodate control of the grievance/arbitration process to employees in
cases involving statutory claims.").
185. See generally United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960).
186.

Gould, Steelworkers Trilogy, supra note 4, at 16.
Kramer, supra note 4, at 10.
188. See Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Assignment ofLabor Arbitration, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 41,
73 (2007).
189. See id. at 70-72 ("If the law were otherwise, our modem economy ... simply could not
exist.").
190. Feller, Taft and Hartley Vindicated,supra note 153, at 303 (citing First Options of Chi.
v. Kaplan & M.K. Invs., 514 U.S. 938, 941-45 (1995)).
191. Id. at 301.
192. Id.

187.
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continued this tradition by maintaining a strict standard for vacating arbitration
awards. 193

Professors Michael LeRoy and Peter Feuille advance a competing approach
to the theory that courts today sometimes exercise an improper level of judicial
deference. 4 They argue that statistical analysis of original cases, rather than
textual analysis of appellate decisions, is a more accurate gauge of court
behavior.' 95 To support their thesis, LeRoy and Feuille cite to improved
arbitration-award confirmation rates in their most recent measurement
period.196 Notwithstanding these improvements, it appears the federal courts
either lack a clear consensus with regard to the limitations on review of arbitral
awards, or recognize, but prefer to ignore, those limits. 97 Because neither
scenario bodes particularly well for the future of arbitration, it matters not what
"gauge" one uses; rather, the end result-that courts still continue to diverge
from established principles-is the better indicator of courts' levels of
deference.
Since 2007, the Sixth Circuit has upheld eleven arbitration awards and
vacated two.' 98 Whether the Sixth Circuit truly has repudiated its activist ways
may depend largely on what grounds the two awards were vacated. If the
court's rationale was merely judicial activism masquerading as deferential
judicial review-a rationale the lower courts have been known to adopt-then
the Sixth Circuit has not genuinely embraced the standard set forth in the
Steelworkers Trilogy. The two cases in which arbitration awards were vacated
are Totes Isotoner Corp. v. International Chemical Workers Union
Council/UFCW Local 664199 and R.H. Cochran & Associates, Inc. v. Sheet
Metal Workers InternationalAss'n Local Union No. 33.200

In Totes Isotoner Corp., the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's order
vacating a supplemental labor-arbitration award.201 Following the Michigan
Family Resources, Inc. "procedural aberration" review standard for vacating
arbitration awards, 202 the Sixth Circuit asked "whether the [a]rbitrator had
193. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (providing the specific circumstances in which an arbitration
award may be vacated).
194. See LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 4, at 193.
195. Id. at 193-94.
196. Id. at 219.
197. See id. at 193-94.
198. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
199. 532 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2008).
200. 335 F. App'x 516 (6th Cir. 2009).
201.

Totes Isotoner Corp., 532 F.3d at 406.

Under this standard, the key questions are:
Did the arbitrator act "outside his authority" by resolving a dispute not committed to
arbitration? Did the arbitrator commit fraud, have a conflict of interest or otherwise act
dishonestly in issuing the award? And in resolving any legal or factual disputes in the
case, was the arbitrator "arguably construing or applying the contract"?

202.

Mich. Family Res., Inc. III, 475 F.3d 746, 753 (6th Cir. 2007).
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authority to interpret [a subsequent collective-bargaining agreement] in
enforcing the original award during the supplemental compliance
proceedings."203 The court held that the arbitrator acted outside of his
authority by addressing a question not presented to him when he said that "if
Management's decision was violative of the 1998-2001 agreement it is
violative of the 2002-2007 agreement;" the arbitrator was only suposed to
This
decide what measures would appropriately remedy the violation.
conclusion was a natural extension of the Trilogy principle that arbitrators
should not dispense their own brand of industrial justice. On the other hand,
the same cannot be said for the court's decision in R.H. Cochran & Associates,
Inc.

In R.H. Cochran & Associates, the district court vacated the arbitration
award because it found that the arbitrators acted outside the scope of their
authority when they ruled on an untimely filed grievance.205 The Sixth Circuit
majority held that, because the record provided sufficient evidence that
Cochran, the employer, made a timeliness objection before the arbitration
panel, and that the Union did not file a grievance within the required thirty-day
period-a fact that the Union conceded-the arbitration panel lost its
"authority to consider the merits of the grievance." 206 The majority stated that
it was applying a deferential standard of review and, as such, could not say that
the district court committed clear error.207
The dissent noted that arguments not raised before an arbitrator are waived
in a motion to vacate the arbitration award; it disagreed, however, with the
majority regarding whether Cochran had in fact presented its timeliness
argument to the arbitration panel.208 If the dissent is correct in its assertion that
the proverbial ball was in Cochran's court to raise the timeliness issue in front
of the arbitration panel, and Cochran failed to do so, then it would appear that
the court should not have vacated the arbitration award. It could easily be said
that, in the present case, the court failed to defer to the arbitrators, in
contravention of the Steelworkers Trilogy principles.

203.

Totes Isotoner Corp., 532 F.3d at 414.

204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 416.
335 F. App'x 516, 517 (6th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 518-20.
Id at 520.

208.

Id. at 522 (Clay, J., dissenting) (citing Order of Ry. Conductors v. Clinchfield R. Co.,

407 F.2d 985, 988 (6th Cir.1969) ("[D]efects in proceedings prior to or during arbitration may be
waived by a party's acquiescence in the arbitration with knowledge of the defect.")); see also
Armco Emps. Indep. Fed'n, Inc. v. AK Steel Corp., 149 F. App'x 347, 352 (6th Cir. 2005)
("Generally, arguments not presented to an arbitrator are deemed waived and cannot be raised for
the first time in an enforcement action in a district court.").

Catholic University Law Review

74

[Vol. 60:47

V. CONCLUSION
The landmark Steelworkers Trilogy decisions were clear and explicit: a court
ordinaril should defer to the arbitrator's decision and uphold the arbitrator's
award. 20 This deference to private labor arbitration, most immediately and
with some frequency, honors what the parties contracted for through collective
bargaining-a final and binding decision by a third-party arbitrator. More
strategically, this application enhances the integrity of the very nature of
arbitration, one of the genuine cornerstones of labor-management dispute
resolution.
Various circuit courts have historically struggled to divorce themselves from
their natural powerful and authoritative position as decision-makers in order to
defer to arbitration awards.2o On its face, the arbitration dynamic appears
hierarchically chaotic. Yet, it properly occurs every day, as powerful, federal
judges defer to labor arbitrators' decisions.211 Although an understandable,
palpable sense of unease remains-and as difficult as it may be for somecourts must defer to potentially mediocre arbitral decisions. In light of the
Trilogy's precepts, "the requirement [is] that [judges] tolerate 'serious' legal
errors in arbitration awards." 212
It was common practice, and deeply problematic, that courts vacated awards
with which they substantively disagreed. This approach not only sidestepped
the rationale of the Supreme Court; it had the potential to substantially
debilitate the stature of the labor-arbitration process as a whole by encouraging
parties on the losing end of arbitration to challenge the decisions in federal
court. This, on the whole, can pemiciously foster floods of litigation by giving
the discouraged party a "second bite at the apple," a concept that undermines
the ability of arbitration to be a final and binding resolution of labormanagement disputes.
Until its en banc reaffirmation of judicial fealty to the unvarnished Trilogy
principles, the maverick Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was at the
forefront of the activist judiciary predisposed to readily vacate arbitration
awards.213 It did so at an alarming and accelerating rate, while simultaneously
invoking the Trilo as little more than an inherently malleable, rhetorical
policy instrument.
However, "decisions like the one at issue in Michigan
Family Resources, Inc. are less the result of hostility than they are the court's

209. See supra Part I.
210. See COX ETAL., supra note 58.

211.

Id.

212.

Mich. Family Res., Inc. II, 438 F.3d 653, 662 (6th Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 475 F.3d

746 (6th Cir. 2007).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
214. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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reluctance to abandon their traditional responsibilities."2 15 The Sixth Circuit in
its opinion
cited the right cases and made the appropriate observations about
the limited scope of its review, but then it read the contract to admit
of only one meaning and, because the arbitrator's reading was
different, it concluded he exceeded his authority by adding a term
and that his award did not draw its essence from the contract.216
But in fact, according to the Trilogy, the Sixth Circuit exceeded its
authority. 2 17
Since Michigan Family Resources, Inc. III, the trend in the Sixth Circuit

dramatically changed direction and the court finally embraced the importance
of deferring to an arbitrator's award despite disagreeing with the substance of
21
Ultimately, collective bargaining cannot be compromised by
the decision.218
interventionist courts cavalierly intruding into labor-management alternate
dispute resolution that the private parties reserved to arbitration by the express
terms of their collective-bargaining agreements.
Michigan Family Resources, Inc. III has ramifications far beyond the

crucible of labor-management relations. The future viability of much of
commercial arbitration, for example, is calibrated, at least in part, via reference
to developments in the law and practice of labor arbitration. The fundamental
dynamic of each remains constant-that is, the resolution of disputes decided
by a neutral third-party arbitrator, not the courts.219 Accordingly, lower courts
must respect the limitation on the review of arbitral awards to preserve the
nature of arbitration. Without a consistent approach among lower courts that
adheres to the Supreme Court precedent, the power of arbitrators in both labor
and commercial aspects will suffer indefinitely, and the pillars of arbitration
will ultimately erode.
In the fifty years since the Steelworkers Trilogy, arbitration has continued to
provide a very effective mechanism for resolving labor-management
disputes.220 However, the process has certainly not been uniformly smooth,
and the efficacy of arbitration has been periodically jeopardized by many lower
courts' failure to adhere to the guidelines articulated by the Supreme Court in
215. Brief of National Academy of Arbitrators, supra note 7, at 7. The brief also noted that
"the Supreme Court's decisions require judicial restraint and compel enforcement of the award,
even if the Court believes the arbitrator was wrong, or that the contract language is not
susceptible to the arbitrator's interpretation, or, indeed, even if the decision is wrong." Id.
216. Id. at 10.
217. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 569 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
218. See supra Part II.B.
219.

See Feller, Taft andHartley Vindicated,supra note 153, at 30.

220. Brief of National Academy of Arbitrators, supra note 7, at 16 (explaining that
arbitration is typically "faster and less costly than litigation and, most important, final").
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the Trilogy221 and reiterated in Misco222 and Garvey.2 Michigan Family
Resources, Inc. III is a substantial bulwark against inappropriate activist
judiciary intervention in the labor-arbitration process.

221. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-69 (explaining that the courts should not weigh the
merits of a case before them that have been addressed by arbitration provided for in an
agreement); Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 585 (noting that questions concerning
the substance of a dispute covered by a collective-bargaining agreement that provides for
arbitration are for the arbitrator to decide, not the courts); Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at
596 ("The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to
arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.").
222. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 46-47 (1987) (reiterating
the deference courts should afford to arbitration awards made under a collective-bargaining
agreement).
223. Major League Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (per curium)
("Judicial review of a labor-arbitration decision pursuant to such an agreement is very limited.
Courts are not authorized to review the arbitrator's decision on the merits despite allegations that
the decision rests on factual errors or misinterprets the parties' agreement.")

